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ABSTRACT 
 
I analyse TFP growth at the sectoral and aggregate level, using data for 10 industry groups 
covering the market sector for 18 countries over the period 1970-2007 drawn from the EU 
KLEMS dataset. TFP growth displays persistence at the aggregate level but not at the 
industry level, suggesting industry outputs are measured with error. In all countries resources 
have been shifting away from industries with high TFP growth towards industries with low 
TFP growth. Nevertheless I find that structural change (as measured by changes in value 
added shares) has favoured growth in most countries. Errors in measuring capital or in 
measuring the elasticity of output with respect to capital are unlikely to substantially reduce 
the role of TFP in explaining growth. The pattern of growth in these 18 countries is more 
consistent with an underlying two-sector model than with the one-sector (Solow) model. 
Standard theory suggests that TFP growth induces capital accumulation, at least in the long 
run. This is not the case with the raw EU KLEMS data used here. But standard theory finds 
some support when the data are smoothed to remove cyclical effects.  
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1. Introduction1 
 
It is generally agreed that increases in labour productivity are the only long run source of 
growth in living standards. And since Solow (1956) a wide though not universal consensus 
has existed that behind the growth of labour productivity stands the growth of Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). Without continuing TFP growth there can be no continuing growth in 
labour productivity since capital accumulation by itself would be subject to diminishing 
returns. But what are the sources of TFP growth? The literature (surveyed by Hulten (2001)) 
suggests that measured TFP growth can arise in one or more of the following ways:  
 
1. From technical and scientific progress (including improvements in management 
techniques). This does not include progress embodied in new or improved types of capital or 
which is purchased directly via for example consultancy. Only progress which comes for free 
is to be included here.  
2. From learning effects, either learning by doing or learning from others, or more broadly 
from externalities and economies of scale.  
3. By reallocation of inputs towards more (or less) productive uses, either at the firm or the 
industry level.  
4. As an artefact of measurement error (as when increases in the quality of human or physical 
capital are wrongly ignored or output is mismeasured) or when some types of asset (such as 
intangibles) are wrongly omitted.  
 
A particular concern in the literature has been the role of capital. In the past some at least of 
measured TFP growth would have been rightly attributed to the fact that indices of capital 
input were crude, e.g. horsepower. And some, including the originator of TFP as a theoretical 
concept and pioneer of its empirical measurement (Solow 1957), thought that price indices of 
capital goods did not allow for quality change. But nowadays it is accepted that they should 
and this principle is enshrined in the OECD Productivity and Capital Manuals (OECD 2001 
and 2009). But the extent to which capital is well-measured in practice is still open to debate 
and will be discussed in what follows. The earlier growth accounting literature also paid a lot 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version benefited from the comments of participants at the IARIW Conference in Dresden, 
Germany, in August 2016, particularly of my discussant, Marcel Timmer. I also benefited from comments 
received when the paper was presented at the Philadelphia Fed, particularly from Leonard Nakamura. The 
current version has been greatly improved by the comments of Andrew Sharpe and two anonymous referees. An 
abridged version has appeared as Oulton (2016).  
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of attention to capital measurement (Griliches and Jorgenson 1967; Jorgenson et al. 1987); in 
particular it introduced the important distinction between capital stocks and capital services. 
The result of these pioneering efforts was to reduce but not eliminate the role of TFP.  
 
This paper discusses some of the (non-exclusive) explanations of TFP growth listed above. A 
particular focus is the extent to which they are consistent with the pattern of TFP growth at 
the industry level. For example, it is not obvious how technical and scientific progress leads, 
year by year, to TFP growth in retailing. The factors which are important here are likely quite 
different to those which are important in (say) semiconductors. The fact that industry TFP 
growth rates differ suggests adding a fifth source of TFP growth at the aggregate level:  
 
5. Shifts in the structure of output and demand leading to changes in the aggregate growth 
rate of TFP and hence of aggregate labour productivity. These shifts could be favourable or 
unfavourable to growth.  
 
The paper therefore employs data from the EU KLEMS dataset to study the properties of TFP 
growth at the industry level. It seeks to quantify and assess the sources listed above as causes 
of TFP growth (except I shall have very little to say about the third source). I refer to the 
“mystery” of TFP since though almost everyone agrees it is fundamental to growth there is 
no consensus as to how much of measured TFP growth should be allocated to each of the five 
sources just listed. And as we shall see, the likelihood of significant measurement error 
bedevils further progress in understanding.  
 
1.2 Plan of the paper 
 
Section 2 describes the EU KLEMS dataset to be used in the empirical work and sets out 
some of its advantages by contrast with the micro data so popular nowadays. Section 3 uses 
this dataset to set out the broad facts about TFP growth and the allocation of resources to 
different industries in 18 countries over the years 1970-2007 (though not every country has 
data for all years). Section 4 asks a basic question about TFP growth: how persistent is it? 
This question relates to the first source of TFP growth, technical and scientific progress. The 
answer depends on whether we are looking at the industry level or at the aggregate level. 
Section 5 then turns to the issue of structural change (the fifth source of TFP growth) and 
whether it has tended to increase or reduce growth at the aggregate level. The motivation here 
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is that the industry to which resources have been shifting in every country is business services 
which has negative TFP growth in 17 out of the 18 countries. The possibility of measurement 
error (the fourth source) plays an important part here. The fourth source is studied again in 
Section 6, where I consider whether mismeasurement of capital, usually leading to 
understatement of capital growth, can account for an appreciable part of measured TFP 
growth . Such mismeasurement could take the form of understated quality change, missing 
assets (such as some intangibles), or failure to account for increases in the variety of capital 
goods available on the market. Section 7 analyses whether, even if capital is measured 
correctly, its impact on growth may not be. There might be externalities which make the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital greater than the value suggested by capital’s share 
in the value of output (the standard measure in the growth accounting literature); this is the 
second source of TFP growth. Here I also consider whether the evidence is more consistent 
with a two-sector than a one-sector model. Section 8 concludes.  
 
 
2. The EU KLEMS dataset 
 
Much of the empirical analysis to follow uses data from the EU KLEMS dataset described in 
O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) which is freely available for download at www.euklems.net. 
More specifically, I use the March 2011 update of the November 2009 release (downloaded 
on 27th October 2015 as a file called all_countries_09I.txt). This file contains data on national 
accounts and growth accounting variables for 29 countries over 1970-2007. In particular it 
contains data on TFP growth (the value added concept), real and nominal value added, real 
and nominal gross output, labour services and capital services. Its estimates of labour input 
allow for labour quality and are on an hours worked basis. Its estimates of capital services 
distinguish between ICT and non-ICT assets and are estimated on a comparable basis across 
countries. However these data are not available for all countries and all years. Data on TFP 
are only available for a maximum of 18 countries (which includes three non-European 
countries: Australia, Japan and the US). So the following 11 countries which lacked TFP data 
were dropped: Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. The maximum number of time series observations is 37 (Italy 
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and the UK) and the minimum number is 11 (Slovenia). The included countries, together with 
the years for which each has data for TFP growth, are in Table 1.2  
 
The EU KLEMS dataset has two great strengths. First, it is consistent with the national 
accounts of the countries included. Second it goes beyond the national accounts by using a 
common methodology for estimating labour quality and capital services. Furthermore labour 
quality and capital services are estimated in a disaggregated manner: 18 types of labour 
(distinguished by educational attainment (3 types), sex (2) and age (3)) and 7 types of capital 
asset (3 in ICT and 4 in non-ICT assets3). Labour input is measured by hours worked not 
number of workers.  
 
The EU KLEMS dataset therefore contrasts with micro (firm-level or establishment-level) 
data which are not usually consistent with the national accounts. Also in micro data firm- or 
establishment-level estimates of capital and labour are often crude. For example, for capital 
frequently only nominal book value (a stock not a flow measure) is available which then has 
to be deflated by some overall deflator. This is generally the case for all studies based on 
company accounts (e.g. Bartelsman et al. 2013; for India and China see Hsieh and Klenow 
2009). Studies based on census data usually have to make do with investment, often 
aggregated over asset types, to which it is difficult to apply the Perpetual Inventory Model. 
Firm-level prices are usually not available so firm output has to be deflated by an industry 
deflator; on the rare occasions when firm-level prices can be observed there are substantial 
differences between them and the corresponding industry-level deflators (Foster et al. 2008). 
Labour input must frequently be measured by the number of employees. These criticisms are 
not meant to disparage micro-level studies, just to point out that the data on which they are 
based do not dominate empirically the data behind industry-level studies. So micro-level 
studies should be seen as complements to, not substitutes, for industry-level ones.4  
 
The growth accounting variables in EU KLEMS are broken down by industry in accordance 
with Revision 1 of the NACE. There are (roughly) 21 2-digit industry groups — “roughly” 
                                                 
2
 The EU KLEMS database has previously been analysed by Timmer et al. (2010).  
3
 ICT assets: computers, communication equipment, and software. Non-ICT assets: transport equipment, other 
machinery and equipment, non-residential structures, other. Residential structures are also in the EU KLEMS 
dataset but are not used in productivity analysis.  
4
 See Syverson (2011) for a survey of work on productivity based on micro data. The focus of much of this work 
is on explaining why productivity levels differ across firms rather than on explaining differences in growth rates. 
He does not address the issue of data reliability.  
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because some groups are aggregates of underlying 2-digit groups — and 16 “1-letter” groups. 
Both the 2-digit and the 1-letter groups collectively add up to GDP. Most of the additional 
detail available at the 2-digit level comes from manufacturing. Since manufacturing has 
received arguably excessive emphasis in previous studies I decided to use the 1-letter level. 
The 16 1-letter groups, A-Q (A is actually combined with B), are set out in Table 2. The 
market sector is defined as the 10 industry groups A-K; note that the criterion for being part 
of the market sector is the nature of the industry, not ownership. Real estate (industry 70) is 
excluded from K (“Renting and business activities”) since it mainly comprises the imputed 
rent of owner-occupiers; sector K is therefore renamed “Business services”. The analysis to 
follow is confined to the market sector and its constituent industries for two reasons. First, the 
measurement of real output in the non-market industry groups is problematic and likely 
inconsistent across countries. Second, since much of it is publicly-owned the motivations of 
decision makers are probably not focused on cost minimization or profit maximization, thus 
calling into question the growth accounting methodology. On average, across all available 
years and countries for which TFP data is present in EU KLEMS, the market sector as 
defined here accounted for 71% of total value added and 75% of total hours worked (Table 
2).  
 
In summary, the results to be reported are for 18 countries and the 10 industry groups 
comprising the market sector over a maximum time span of 1970-2007. The EU KLEMS 
dataset is in the process of being extended to cover the period of the Great Recession and its 
aftermath. But at the time this research began it stopped in 2007. This means that the present 
paper can have nothing to say directly about the effects of the financial crisis on TFP which 
has led to at the very least a temporary slowdown in growth.5 
 
 
3. TFP growth and the allocation of resources across sectors: an overview 
 
3.1 TFP growth  
 
Chart 1 shows TFP growth in the market sector in the 18 countries, both the actual growth 
rate and the growth of TFP after smoothing by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Most 
                                                 
5
 See now on this Oulton and Sebastiá-Barriel (2016) who discuss whether the crisis will affect not just the level 
but also the future growth rate of labour productivity and TFP.  
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countries show little sign of either accelerating or decelerating growth.6 Five countries were 
clearly above their own long run average at the end of our period: Austria, Finland, 
Netherlands and the UK. And five were by then below their own long run average: Australia, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Japan, though in the case of Japan and Italy the HP trend is more 
encouraging. For five others, the data period was too short to allow a conclusion (Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia and Sweden). Much more striking is the difference 
between countries in their mean growth rate (Chart 2). Bottom of the class is Spain at 0.23% 
p.a. and top is Hungary at 2.55% p.a. (though over a short period). Other strong performers 
were Austria, Finland, Ireland and Japan.  
 
Chart 3 shows mean TFP growth rates in each of the 10 sectors within the market sector. The 
highest rates are found in Agriculture (A&B) where the unweighted cross-country mean is 
2.86% p.a. and in Manufacturing (D) where it is 2.15% p.a. The lowest are in Construction 
(F), Hotels and restaurants (H), and Business services (K) where the cross-country means are 
minus 0.18, minus 1.16 and minus 1.17 respectively. It is worrying that there are a 
considerable number of negative rates. For example, 8 out of 18 countries show negative TFP 
growth in Mining & quarrying (C), 5 in Electricity, gas and water (E), 9 in Construction (F), 
12 in Hotels & restaurants (H), 5 in Finance (J) and no less than 17 in Business services (K).  
 
Negative TFP growth suggests firms in these industries are becoming less efficient over time 
or that technical knowledge is being forgotten, which seems highly implausible in peaceful 
conditions. Negative growth may be explicable in some cases. For instance in Mining & 
quarrying deposits may be becoming harder to extract as they are progressively worked out. 
In Electricity, gas and water an increasing burden of environmental regulation might be the 
cause: the costs of meeting the regulations are measured but the benefits in terms of lower 
emissions are not included in output. These explanations do not seem to apply to 
Construction or Hotels & restaurants and still less to Business services which as we shall see 
is one of the sectors to which resources are shifting in all these countries. Hence one must 
suspect measurement error as already noted by Timmer et al. (2010) in the case of business 
services. If measurement error is present the first place to look is errors in output 
measurement. It is well known that price indices for private services are poorly developed by 
                                                 
6
 This contrasts with labour productivity at the whole economy level where there are signs of a pervasive 
slowdown commencing prior to the global financial crisis, at least in large economies (Cette et al. 2016; OECD 
2016, chapter 5). For the US Byrne et al. (2016) document slowing TFP and labour productivity growth since 
2004.  
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contrast to those of the industrial sector (though even those are not beyond reproach as 
discussed below); see Bean (2016, chapter 2) for UK evidence on this. It is quite plausible 
that the relative prices of sophisticated services like legal and advertising services or software 
are falling but that this is not picked up by the deflators actually used (often the GDP deflator 
or the CPI).  
 
3.2 Value added shares 
 
The pattern of resource allocation, as measured by the value added share of each sector in 
market sector GDP, has been changing in all our countries. In general in most countries, the 
share of agriculture and manufacturing has been declining while that of finance and business 
services has been rising (Chart 4). Chart 4a shows the agriculture share. It is falling in all 
countries except perhaps the US. The share of manufacturing has been falling in 11 countries 
(including even Germany) and flat in 6: Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia 
and Sweden, though in some of these the data period is short. It has been rising only in 
Ireland (Chart 4b). In construction the picture is different. In most countries the share is flat 
but rising in Spain and Ireland, particularly from around 1990 (Chart 4c). The share of 
wholesale and retail trade shows little change (Chart 4d). The share of hotels and restaurants 
is flat except in Spain and to a lesser extent Italy and the UK (Chart 4e). Finance displays a 
rising trend in 9 countries though in some the rise is in the first half of our period, e.g. France. 
The sharpest rise occurred in Ireland, the UK and the US. In Belgium, Denmark and Italy the 
share is flat. In Austria and Sweden it is hump-shaped, centred around the early 1990s (Chart 
4f). The clearest pattern is seen in business services (K, exc. 70) whose share has been rising 
in every country (Chart 4g). This means that in most countries resources have been shifting 
away from agriculture and manufacturing where TFP growth is apparently at its most rapid 
towards in particular business services where TFP growth is measured as negative. The 
implications of this (on the face of it) puzzling fact will be pursued in section 5.  
 
 
4. Persistence of TFP 
 
If TFP growth is caused by underlying developments in science and technology then we 
would expect TFP growth to be persistent. The benefit arising from some scientific or 
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technological advance is not likely to be dissipated within a year; there is ample evidence that 
innovations (including improvements in managerial techniques) take time to diffuse across 
the firms within an industry.7 We can test this proposition by running the following 
regression: 
 
, 1ijt ij t ijtg g Controlsβ ε−= + +   (1) 
where ijtg  is the growth rate of TFP in the i-th industry of the j-th country in year t and ijtε  is 
an error term. The controls are industry, country and year dummies. We run the same 
regression for the market sector as a whole:  
 
, 1
MS MS MS
it i t itg g Controlsβ ε−= + +   (2) 
Here MSitg  is the TFP growth rate for the market sector as a whole, constructed as a weighted 
average of the industry-level growth rates (empirically, a Törnqvist index using value added 
weights). The results of running these regressions using the EU KLEMS dataset described 
above are in Table 3.  
 
Whether we include one, two or three lags of the dependent variable, the lagged variables are 
never significant at the 5% level or better. Despite including industry, country and year 
dummies the degree of explanatory power as measured by R2 is always low, less than 7% 
(columns 2-4). Including up to three lags does not raise R2 appreciably relative to including 
none (compare column 1). Splitting the sample into two does not raise the significance of the 
lagged dependent variables (columns 5-8).8 But aggregating over the 10 industries does 
(column 9). Now the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is of non-negligible size 
(0.231) and highly significant. R2 is also considerably higher at 0.325. That there is excessive 
year-to-year variation in TFP growth is suggested by column 10 where TFP growth in each 
industry and country has been averaged over time. Now the inclusion of industry and country 
dummies can “explain” about 47% of the variation in the dependent variable.  
 
In summary, at the 10-sector level there appears to be no significant persistence in TFP 
growth. But for the market sector as a whole there is substantial and statistically significant 
persistence. A likely explanation is that there are offsetting errors in the industry-level TFP 
                                                 
7
 Persistence of TFP growth at the aggregate level is an important feature of RBC models such as the one in 
Kydland and Prescott (1982).  
8
 I also tried running the regression for each industry separately (including country and year dummies) but this 
led to estimates of persistence that were significant at the 5% level in only two out of 10 cases: Agriculture 
where persistence was negative and Manufacturing where it was positive though low (0.145).  
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estimates arising most probably from errors in industry-level value added (see below). To 
justify this claim, consider first the effect of errors in industry-level TFP growth on estimates 
of the persistence parameter β . Suppose that the true relationship is  
 1ijt ijt ijtg g Controlsβ ε−= + +     (3) 
where ijtg  is the true measure of TFP growth and ijtε  is assumed to be serially and spatially 
uncorrelated. The actual measure is related to the true one by  
 ijt ijt ijtg g η= +   (4) 
Here ijtη  is a random measurement error assumed uncorrelated over time and uncorrelated 
with the ijtε  but with the property that the errors cancel out within a given country in a given 
year:  
 
1
0N ijt ijti v η= =∑   (5) 
where ijtv  is the share of the j-th industry in the i-th country’s market sector value added in 
year t. Now substituting (3) and (4) into (1) we can see that the regression equation (1) now 
has the classic errors-in-variables form with measurement error in the independent variable:  
 
, 1 , 1[ ]ijt ij t ijt ij t ijtg g Controlsβ η βη ε− −= + + − +   (6) 
The independent variable 
, 1ij tg −  is correlated with the error term because of (4), hence the 
OLS estimate of β  is biased towards zero: see e.g. Greene (2008), chapter 12, page 326. 
(There is also measurement error in the dependent variable but this affects only the standard 
error of β  and does not cause bias).  
 
Suppose instead we run the same regression at the market sector level, equation (2), taking 
market sector TFP growth to be a weighted average of the industry-level rates:  
 
1
NMS
it ijt ijtjg v g==∑   (7) 
So using (4) and (5):  
 
1
NMS
it ijt ijtjg v g==∑    (8) 
Using (3), (7) and (8) and ignoring for simplicity the controls we find that  
 
, 1 , 11 1 1
( )N N NMS MSit ijt ijt it ijt ij t ij t ijt ijti i ig v g g v v g vβ ε− −= = == = + − +∑ ∑ ∑       (9) 
Applying (4) and (5) we obtain 
 
, 1 , 1 , 11
( )NMS MS MSit i t ijt ij t ij t itig g v v gβ ε− − −== + − +∑    (10) 
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putting 
1
NMS
it ijt ijti vε ε==∑  . Now the error term 
MS
itε  is uncorrelated with the independent 
variable 
, 1
MS
i tg −  so we there will be no attenuation, i.e. the OLS estimate of β  is unbiased. It is 
true that there is now an additional term on the right hand side, 
, 1 , 11
( )N ijt ij t ij ti v v g− −= −∑  , but this 
is likely to be small and uncorrelated with 
, 1
MS
i tg −  so omitting it (as in the results discussed 
above) is unlikely to bias the estimate of β .  
 
How are errors in the TFP growth series most likely to arise? Consider Table 4 which shows 
the standard deviations of TFP growth and its two main components, the growth of real value 
added per hour and the contribution of capital deepening (calculated as a residual). Real value 
added per hour is further broken down into its components: real value added, nominal value 
added, the price of value added and hours worked. Two striking features are apparent. First, 
the standard deviation of the capital deepening contribution is much lower than that of labour 
productivity (real value added per hour); this is surprising given that investment is usually 
considered to be one of the more volatile components of GDP. Second, after breaking labor 
productivity growth down into its components, the highest standard deviations of all are for 
nominal value added and the price of value added. The high standard deviation of nominal 
value added growth may arise from the national income balancing process carried out within 
the framework of supply and use tables, a practice common amongst National Statistical 
Institutes (NSIs). If the NSI adjusts gross output and value added at the industry level so that 
the sum across industries agrees with a control total then this could induce offsetting errors in 
nominal industry outputs. Balancing is typically done at a low level of aggregation (e.g. 60-
100 or more industries). So this could also induce offsetting errors in the price deflators at the 
industry group level used here since the latter are weighted averages of price indices from a 
much lower level. So if the components of gross output in some industry group are distorted 
then the weights for the industry-group deflators are similarly distorted.9  
 
Oulton and Rincon-Aznar (2013) found that the implied rates of return to capital were very 
implausible at the industry level in the EU KLEMS dataset, and were very volatile over time. 
One explanation for this is that gross operating surplus, part of value added, has been 
                                                 
9
 As a referee pointed out to me, the model of measurement error is hard to distinguish from an alternative 
where the error term in equation (4) ijtη  represents genuine random technology shocks. I feel that this 
interpretation is less likely given the evidence of Table 4 which shows the much higher variance of nominal 
value added and its price than of the other components of TFP.  
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misallocated across industries. This is consistent with the argument that nominal value added 
has been misallocated across industries.10  
 
This discussion is not meant as a criticism of the EU KLEMS dataset which was necessarily 
dependent on the underlying national accounts data supplied by NSIs. It does however justify 
using averaging or other smoothing processes in the empirical work which follows.  
 
I conclude that despite initial appearances TFP growth probably exhibits persistence at the 10 
industry group level as well as at the market sector level. So these results are weakly 
consistent with the view that sees technical progress as the driving force behind TFP growth.  
 
 
5. Structural change and increasing specialization  
 
The first aim of this section is to show theoretically that aggregate TFP growth rises when 
resources (value added) are shifting towards industries supplying intermediate goods and 
services. This is the case even when these supplying industries themselves have low TFP 
growth (provided it is positive). The second aim is to quantify the size of these effects in our 
18 countries.  
 
5.1 Aggregate and industry-level TFP growth: theory 
 
Let us begin with a brief review of TFP growth at the aggregate and industry level; see The 
Appendix for a more detailed exposition. Start by defining the aggregate growth rate of TFP 
( )µ ), aka the Solow residual, as  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ: (1 )V K Lµ α α= − − −   (11) 
where V is real GDP, K is aggregate capital services, L is aggregate labour input, α  is the 
capital (profit) share, and hats denote growth rates, e.g. ˆ ln /V d V dt=  where t is time; the 
symbol “:=” denotes a definition.  
 
                                                 
10
 Oulton and Rincon-Aznar (2013) also suggested that the allocation of investment by NSIs to different 
industries may be a problem. However for growth accounting purposes we are dealing with growth rates of 
capital so (consistent) errors in capital levels are not an issue here. Also, averaging of growth rates will tend to 
remove time-varying errors.  
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In Solow’s original formulation (Solow 1957) equation (11) was justified as deriving from an 
aggregate production function  
 ( ) ( , )V A t f K L=   (12) 
under constant returns and perfect competition. The parameter ˆ( )Aµ =  can be interpreted as 
the rate of disembodied technical progress (manna from heaven), though Solow was well 
aware that TFP as measured by (11) could in practice arise from many other causes.  
 
In fact, the assumption of a an aggregate production function is not needed. Assuming 
marginal cost pricing and that a given input receives the same price in all industries, the 
Solow residual can be given a deeper justification in a multi-industry setting as measuring the 
outward shift of the production possibility frontier made possible by technological change, 
with all inputs including intermediate ones held constant (Hulten 1978; Gabaix 2011, 
Appendix B). Then equation (11) can be justified as a way of measuring the important 
parameter µ  using readily available data.  
 
But the economy is made up of different industries and it seems plausible that technical 
progress occurs at different rates in different industries. So how is the aggregate rate of 
technical progress related to the rates in different industries? At the industry level there are 
two possible concepts of TFP growth, the value added one and the gross output one. The 
gross output concept is based on the existence of an industry production function:  
 1, 1 1( ..., ; , ..., ; , ..., ; )i i i iC i iD i iNY f K K L L M M t=   (13) 
Here iY  is real (gross) output in the i-th industry ( 1,...,i N= ) and there are assumed to be C 
types of capital ikK , D types of labour ilL , and N types of intermediate input ijM  (produced 
by the N industries but possibly also imported). Now define GOiµ  as the gross output concept 
of TFP growth in the i-th industry:  
 
ln
:GO ii
Y
t
µ ∂=
∂
  (14) 
We can then readily find that  
 
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
C D NGO
i i ik ik il il ij ijk l jY K L m Mµ α β= = == − − −∑ ∑ ∑   (15) 
where , ,ik il ijmα β  are the elasticities of the capital, labour and intermediate inputs with 
respect to output. Assuming competitive conditions these elasticities can be equated 
empirically to the share of each input in the value of gross output (the input cost shares).  
17 
 
 
The value added concept of TFP growth is defined by:  
 
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ:
C DVA VA VA
i i ik ik il ilk l
V K Lµ α β
= =
= − −∑ ∑   (16) 
where iV  is real value added in the i-th industry and ,VA VAik ilα β  are the shares of the capital 
and labour inputs in value added. We then find that as a matter of algebra the relationship 
between the two concepts of TFP growth is:  
 
VA GOi
i i
i
GO
VA
µ µ =  
 
  (17) 
where iGO  is nominal gross output and iVA  is nominal value added. Hence VA GOi iµ µ≥  with 
equality iff i iGO VA= . But note that this relationship holds by necessity only if value added 
is measured by double not single deflation (see the Appendix). If single deflation is employed 
then the relationship between the two concepts becomes an empirical question.11  
 
Straightforward algebra shows that the aggregate TFP growth rate as defined by (11) is 
identically equal to the following aggregation scheme:  
 
1
N GO
i ii
dµ µ
=
=∑   (18) 
Here id  is the Domar (1961) weight for the i-th industry, defined as  
 : ii
GOd
GDP
 
=  
 
  (19) 
And using (17) we also have an alternative aggregation scheme based on the value added 
measure:  
 
1
N VA
i ii
vµ µ
=
=∑   (20) 
For these equivalences to hold we just need to assume that a given input earns the same 
return wherever it is employed.12 If this is not the case then the aggregate formulas become 
more complex with additional terms reflecting the shift of resources to or from industries 
where they are more highly valued (see Jorgenson et al. (1987), chapter 2, page 66). In what 
follows I ignore these complications which are not probably of great importance empirically 
                                                 
11
 Diewert (2015) derives discrete analogues for the continuous time formula of equation (17) in the Laspeyres, 
Paasche and Fisher cases.  
12
 Equation (20) also requires that real value added by measured by double not single deflation. This is the case 
for most of our 18 countries though the UK is an exception. See equation (32) of the Appendix for the definition 
of double deflation.  
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in advanced economies (at least, Jorgenson et al. (1987) did not find them important for the 
US over 1948-79). 13 
 
The gross output concept of industry TFP growth is more fundamental than the value added 
one. The value added concept is derived from the gross output one under an additional, 
restrictive assumption: real gross output per unit of real intermediate input is determined 
entirely by input prices and can never be reduced by technical progress. Only under this 
condition does a value added production function exist (though whether or not it exists we 
can always calculate the value added concept of TFP using equation (16)). And we can 
always convert a value added measure into a gross output one using (17). So there would 
seem to be no need to consider the value added measure at all. However in practice value 
added measures are more readily available. So we cannot dispense completely with the value 
added measure of TFP.  
 
5.2 Increasing specialization as an additional source of growth  
 
Let us consider the aggregate rate of technical progress, as described by equation (18) 
relating aggregate and industry TFP growth rates, in more detail. First, it tells us that the 
aggregate TFP growth rate depends not just on technical progress in individual industries but 
also on the pattern of demand. Suppose a country loses comparative advantage in one of its 
export industries which happens to have a relatively fast rate of TFP growth. Then other 
things equal the aggregate rate will decline as resources shift towards less progressive 
industries. Another story leading to the same conclusion is the cost disease model of Baumol 
(1967). Suppose that over time consumer demand is shifting towards final demand services 
such as entertainment, health and education which have low productivity growth. In this case 
too resources will be shifting towards technologically unprogressive industries so the overall 
productivity rate will be declining.  
 
But this is not the whole story. To see why consider the Domar weight in more detail. This 
can be decomposed as  
                                                 
13
 Note that under this approach there is no role for differences in the level of TFP across industries to affect the 
aggregate TFP growth rate, e.g. by shifts in labour and capital towards industries with a higher TFP level. This 
contrasts with the situation for labour productivity, on which see for example Reinsdorf (2015). The reason is 
that a given input is assumed to receive the same return in every industry, so there is no possibility for example 
of capital earning a higher return in some industries than in others. There is in any case competitive pressure to 
equalise TFP levels across different industries in a given country (Baumol and Wolff 1984).  
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Final sales by Intermediate sales byi
i
GO i id
GDP GDP GDP
= = +   (21) 
Consider for simplicity a closed economy. Then there are three points to note. First, the first 
ratio on the right hand side must necessarily be a fraction between 0 and 1 and the sum of 
these fractions is 1 since the sum of final sales equals GDP. Hence a rise in this fraction for 
one industry must necessarily be accompanied by a fall for one or more other industries. 
Second, the second ratio on the right hand side of (21) can in principle take any non-negative 
value. So the sum over industries of the Domar weights must be at least 1 (it is typically 
much greater, over 2, as we shall see), since the sum of final sales equals GDP. Third, it is 
possible for the sum of the Domar weights to rise over time if the degree of outsourcing is 
rising generally. Consequently the aggregate growth rate of TFP rises if all industry TFP 
growth rates are unchanged but the degree of outsourcing increases. This adds a new and 
different source of growth to those usually considered.  
 
This is most clearly seen if we consider an extreme case of an industry which sells only 
intermediate products. An example is business services in a closed economy (so there are no 
exports or imports of business services). Suppose that resources move towards this industry 
so that its sales rise faster than GDP, either because its products are cheaper than the same 
ones produced in-house or because it develops attractive new products. Then the aggregate 
TFP growth rate will increase without any change in the industry gross output TFP growth 
rates. Notice that this will still be the case even if the TFP growth rate is lower in business 
services than elsewhere (say in manufacturing). In other words, the aggregate TFP growth 
rate still rises even though resources are shifting towards a technologically unprogressive 
industry, so long as TFP growth in this industry is positive.14  
 
So we have reached the paradoxical conclusion that the aggregate TFP growth rate can rise 
even if resources are shifting towards industries with lower productivity growth, provided 
these industries are selling intermediate not final products. The explanation for this paradox is 
                                                 
14
 This is a qualification to the cost-disease argument in Baumol (1967). The latter is still correct as long as it is 
understood to refer to industries producing final, not intermediate, products. All this is explained more fully in 
Oulton (2001). The basic point was generously acknowledged by Baumol in Krueger (2001, page 223), in 
Baumol (2002), pages 277-278, and further analysed in Baumol (2012), particularly chapters 9 and 10 (Wu 
2012a and 2012b). Ngai and Pissarides (2007) subsequently showed that Baumol’s original conclusion that the 
aggregate growth rate would decline need not follow in the long run: in a model with capital the equilibrium 
growth rate is constant even though employment shifts progressively to the stagnant sectors. However their 
model predicts that value added shares are constant in the long run and this is hard to square with the evidence 
presented above that these shares have been steadily changing over periods measured in decades.  
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that in this situation the industry-level value added TFP growth rate is misleading since it 
rises when the degree of outsourcing rises: see equation (17). In fact it is the shift in resources 
away from industries with higher productivity growth which makes them look even more 
progressive (on the value added measure) than they did before.  
 
More formally, consider a closed economy with only two industries. The first industry 
(“cars”) makes only final sales. It buys inputs from the second industry (“business services”) 
which makes only intermediate sales. Then the Domar weights in the two industries are:  
 
1 1
1
2 12 1 1 1
2
1 1
1
1
GO Fd
GDP GDP
GO M GO VA VAd
GDP GDP GO GO
= = =
−
= = = = −
  (22) 
Here 1F  is final sales by the car industry which by assumption are equal to GDP and 12M  is 
intermediate sales by business services to the car industry (necessarily equal to the latter’s 
intermediate purchases). Now if the degree of outsourcing by the car industry rises (the 
1 1/VA GO  ratio falls), then the Domar weight for business services rises while that for cars is 
constant. So for given gross output TFP growth rates in the two industries the aggregate TFP 
growth rate increases (by equation (18)).15  
 
5.3 How much have the Domar weights changed in practice? 
 
Another way to decompose the Domar weights is the following:  
 
i i i
i i i
i
GO GO VAd u v
GDP VA GDP
   
= = =     
  (23) 
where  
: /i i iu GO VA=  
measures as we have said the degree of outsourcing in the i-th industry and  
: /i iv VA GDP=  
                                                 
15
 In this simplified case the sum of the Domar weights increases; the upper limit of the sum is 2. In general, if 
there were N-k industries selling final goods and k selling intermediate goods the limit of the Domar sum is 
again 2. In practice the Domar sum exceeds 2 (even in a closed economy) since all industries have some 
intermediate sales. 
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measures the importance of the industry in the economy. (In the simplified two-industry case 
just discussed these two ratios move in inverse proportion to each other in the car industry so 
that its Domar weight stays constant while that of the business services industry rises.) The 
sum of the Domar weights  
 
1 1
N N i i
ii i
i
GO VAd
VA GDP= =
   
=      
∑ ∑   (24) 
now appears as an interesting statistic in its own right. It is the weighted average of the 
degree of outsourcing in the economy’s industries, the weights being value added.  
 
Chart 5 shows how the sum of the Domar weights (the Domar sum) has changed over time in 
each country. In every country the sum exceeds 2, in some such as Belgium or the Czech 
Republic substantially so. The Domar sum shows a clear upward trend in Austria, Belgium, 
Finland and Italy; there is a less pronounced upward trend in Sweden, France and Germany. 
It is flat in Australia, Japan, Netherlands, UK and US.  
 
Charts 6a, 6b and 6c show the Domar weights over time for three important sectors: 
Manufacturing (D), Finance (J) and Business services (K, exc. 70). The weight for 
manufacturing is clearly declining in eight countries, flat in five, and clearly rising in only 
two. In Finance the Domar weight is rising in every country except Sweden, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovenia. In Business service the weight is rising in all 18 countries.  
 
A clearer picture emerges by collapsing the 10 sectors into three broad groups (Table 3). 
Sectors A-F constitute the goods-producing or “production” part of the economy. Sectors G 
and H (trade, hotels and restaurants) mainly provide consumer services, while Sectors I, J and 
K (exc. 70) (transport, communication, financial and business services) mainly provide 
services to other industries. The broad picture is that the Domar weight for the production 
part of the economy has declined in 13 of the 18 countries (the largest declines were in Japan 
and the UK). For consumer services the weight rose by a modest amount. The weight for 
finance and business services broadly defined (sections I, J and K) rose in all 18 countries 
and on average by more than the fall in the weight for production. In consequence there was a 
rise in the Domar sum in 13 out of the 18 countries.  
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5.4 Measuring the impact of structural change 
 
We are now in a position to estimate the impact of structural change on aggregate TFP 
growth, making use of equation (18):  
 
1
N GO
i ii
dµ µ
=
=∑   
We don’t have gross output estimates of TFP growth but we can find them from the value 
added estimates in EU KLEMS using equation (17). Then treating these as parameters we can 
estimate the effect of different patterns of demand, both final and intermediate (the Domar 
weights), on the aggregate TFP growth rate. Two natural questions are first, what would the 
aggregate TFP growth rate have been if the pattern of demand in each country had remained 
that of the beginning of the period? And second, what would it have been if the pattern at the 
end of the period had prevailed throughout?  
 
Table 4 shows the answers to these two questions. For reference, column 1 shows the mean 
TFP growth rate in the market sector that was actually observed (as already shown in Chart 
2). A first shot at the answers appears in columns (2), (3) and (8). Column (2), headed “Initial 
structure”, shows for each country the mean TFP growth rate with the pattern of demand (the 
id ) set equal to the average of the first two years of the sample in each country in every year. 
Column 3, headed “Latest structure”, shows a similar calculation but with the pattern of 
demand set equal to an average of the last two years of the sample in every year. In both 
columns (2) and (3) I use the actual TFP growth rates estimated for each industry. Column 
(8) shows the difference between columns (2) and (3): the growth rate under the latest 
structure minus the growth rate under the initial one.  
 
The effect of structural change is seen to be predominantly negative. Only 5 out of the 18 
countries show a positive effect: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and 
Sweden. The unweighted cross-country mean of the change is minus 0.13 % p.a. 
Arithmetically, the reason for this is clear: in all countries resources have been shifting to 
Business services (sector K) but in this sector TFP growth is almost invariably estimated to 
be negative (Chart 2). So any shift of resources towards this sector will seemingly have 
reduced the aggregate growth rate (it will make an increasingly negative contribution to the 
Domar-weighted sum).  
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As noted above the negative TFP growth rate in Business services is very implausible. So in 
the next variant of the calculations I have set the TFP growth rate in this sector equal to the 
actual, observed market sector TFP growth rate in each country and each year. That is, I am 
assuming that the overall TFP growth rate is correct, but the measured rate in Business 
services is wrong. So there must be offsetting errors in the other sectors which need to be 
correspondingly adjusted to leave the aggregate rate unchanged. That is, from the value 
added formula for aggregate TFP growth (equation (20)) we have:  
 
1 1
N NVA VA
i i i ii i
v vµ µ µ
= =
= =∑ ∑    
Here the VAiµ  are the adjusted TFP growth rates which we need to find. Suppose that it is 
agreed that the growth rate of the N-th sector should be set equal to the aggregate growth rate 
µ , i.e. VANµ µ= . Then we can derive the adjustments to the growth rates in the other sectors 
which will hold the overall average constant: see the Appendix for the details.  
 
These adjusted value-added-based TFP growth rates VAiµ  can be used to derive adjusted 
gross-output-based ones by solving (17):  
 
GO VAi
i i
i
VA
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µ µ =  
 
 
  (25) 
Finally, we can calculate what the aggregate TFP growth rate would have been under an 
alternative pattern of demand ( id ):  
 
1
N GO
i ii
dµ µ
=
=∑     (26) 
 
An alternative, more radical assumption is to adjust the Business services rate upwards but to 
leave the rates in other sectors unchanged, thus raising the overall average. But this would be 
a dubious move for two reasons. First, insofar as business services are sold to other domestic 
sectors (rather than exported) an understatement of TFP growth in this sector (say because 
output is understated) means that TFP growth in the purchasing sectors is overstated. Second, 
that the aggregate rate is correct or at any rate more accurate than the sectoral rates can be 
justified by the way in which NSIs estimate real GDP. Typically this is from the expenditure 
side since expenditure-side price indices like the CPI are considered more accurate than PPIs 
or service industry price indices ; sectoral growth rates are then adjusted so that when 
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aggregated they conform to the estimated growth rate of GDP(E). Hence the more radical 
alternative should be rejected.  
 
Columns (4), (5) and (9) show the results after the TFP growth rate in Business services is set 
equal to the market sector rate, with corresponding adjustments to the other sectors. Now a 
different picture emerges, with 11 countries showing a positive effect of structural change; 
the unweighted mean of this change is plus 0.03 % p.a.. Though the overall average effect is 
small, the effect is quite large for individual countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany and Sweden which all received a boost to productivity growth from structural 
change on the order of 0.1 to 0.3 % p.a. For the 11 gainers there was an average boost to 
growth of 0.17% p.a. This can be compared to the average TFP growth rate in these countries 
of 1.4% p.a. So the effect is of an economically significant size.  
 
There is a case for adjusting the TFP growth rate in Finance (sector J) too, because of the 
well-known difficulties of measuring output here. In Finance the TFP growth rate is usually 
positive but less than the aggregate rate (Chart 2). But adjusting the TFP growth rate of sector 
Finance as well as that of Business services does not make much difference compared with 
just adjusting Business services. 10 countries now show a positive effect and the unweighted 
mean of the change is plus 0.04 % p.a.: see columns (6), (7) and 10.  
 
How sensitive is the finding that most countries have gained from structural change to the 
assumption that TFP growth in Business services, correctly measured, equals that of the 
market sector as a whole? We can test this by setting TFP growth in Business services equal 
to half that of the market sector in each year and each country: see column 11 of Table 4. 
Naturally this reduces the effect of structural change; the cross-country mean increase in TFP 
growth due to structural change is now -0.05 rather than +0.03. But the pattern of gainers and 
losers is very similar: 10 countries are net gainers and 8 are net losers with the winners 
gaining on average 0.15% p.a. and the losers losing 0.21% p.a.  
 
Table 5 digs a bit deeper by showing the contribution of each sector to the change in overall 
TFP growth stemming from structural change. (Here as in column (9) of the previous Table 4 
I set the TFP growth rate in Business services equal to that of the market sector). The 
contribution of Business services (K, exc. 70) to the overall change is positive in all 
countries, ranging from 0.01% p.a. to 0.16% p.a.; it averaged 0.08% per year. But in some 
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countries, notably Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, this was more than 
offset by a negative contribution from Manufacturing (D), so that the overall effect of 
structural change is negative. In other words in these countries deindustrialisation has 
apparently gone so far as to impact negatively on overall growth. 16  
 
 
6. Mismeasurement of capital 
 
6.1 Mismeasurement of quality change  
 
It is entirely plausible that capital is mismeasured and indeed understated due to understated 
quality change, i.e. overstated investment goods price indices (Gordon 1990). But how much 
does this affect TFP measurement? The traditional argument (Jorgenson 1966) is that any 
errors in measuring capital show up on the output side as well as the input side. If the growth 
rate of capital services is underestimated due to measurement error this will tend to 
overestimate TFP growth. But there is an offsetting factor: the growth of GDP will be 
understated as well. This is because the growth of GDP is a weighted average of the growth 
rates of the expenditure components, one of which is investment. So the overall error depends 
on the size of the weights given to investment on the output side (the investment share in 
GDP) and to capital on the input side (the profit share). In the Golden Rule case the two 
shares are equal and the errors cancel out exactly.  
 
More formally, divide output (Y) into consumer goods ( CY ) and investment goods ( IY ). Then 
in a closed economy , the growth of GDP from the expenditure side is 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
C C I IY w Y w Y= +   
where ( )C Iw w  are the shares in final expenditure of consumption (investment). Aggregate 
TFP growth is defined as  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ: (1 )C C I Iw Y w Y K Lµ α α= + − − −   
                                                 
16
 The UK saw the second largest positive effect from Business services but the largest negative effect from 
Manufacturing. However a substantial fraction of the UK’s business services output is exported. So for the UK 
there is a case for revising up the growth rate of market sector TFP if indeed the growth of business services 
output is understated by conventional price indices. If so, the UK might finish up as a net gainer from structural 
change.  
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where α  is the capital share. Now suppose there is an error e in measuring capital growth: 
ˆ
ˆe K K= −  where ˆK  denotes the true growth rate. Also assume a steady state in which the 
growth of investment equals the growth of capital services ( ˆ ˆIY K= ). Then the error in 
measuring TFP growth is  
 TFP error = ( )Iw eα−   
The error in TFP is smaller than the error in capital since Iw α−  is a fraction. Indeed in the 
Golden Rule case ( )Iw α=  the errors cancel out and the TFP error is zero.  
 
Next, suppose capital growth is understated so that 0e > . Then TFP growth will be 
overstated if Iwα > . This condition is likely satisfied for large, advanced economies like the 
United States (which because of its size is not very open) where the investment share is quite 
a bit less than the capital share.  
 
However, these results are for a closed economy. Consider by contrast an economy which 
imports all its capital goods. Such an economy is likely to be small and poor. Then there is no 
error in real GDP since investment is balanced by capital goods imports of equal size. So any 
error in real investment is canceled out by an equal error in real imports. But capital input is 
still understated. So in this case there is no offset and the error in capital measurement 
translates directly into TFP. In this case the TFP error is the profit share times the capital 
input error ( )eα− . For example, if there is a 1% p.a. understatement of the growth of capital 
and the capital share is 0.35 then TFP growth will be overstated by 0.35% p.a. The 
significance of this can be judged by noting that the cross-country mean TFP growth rate in 
our countries was 1.16% p.a. (Table 8). In general the TFP error is likely to be larger in 
small, poor countries than in bigger, richer ones. But errors in measuring capital growth do 
not seem likely to eliminate TFP as a source of growth. According to Table 8, capital per 
hour is growing at 3-4% p.a. So a 1% understatement of capital growth would be a large error 
but would reduce TFP growth by only about 0.35 % and that is before allowing for any 
countervailing error on the output side.  
 
All this is for the aggregate economy. But the errors in TFP measurement are likely to be 
larger at the industry level. The reason is that most industries are users but not producers of 
capital goods. So there are no offsetting errors on the output side to at least partially cancel 
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out the input side error and so reduce the TFP error. This means that TFP growth in capital-
goods -producing industries is likely to be understated and in other industries overstated.  
 
6.2 Missing capital 
 
It is possible that whole classes of capital assets have been omitted from the growth 
accounting calculations because they have been misclassified as intermediate inputs. This 
argument was first raised in regard to software and R&D. In this case the argument was 
accepted and expenditures on software and R&D are now recognized as forms of investment 
in the System of National Accounts (SNA); software but not R&D appears as an investment 
in EU KLEMS. It has also been argued that there is a whole range of other expenditures, 
dubbed intangible investment, which should also be reclassified as investment. These include 
expenditures on building organizational capital, in-house training, and design and marketing: 
see Corrado et al. (2005) and (2009) for the US, Dal Borgo et al. (2013) for the UK and 
Corrado et al. (2013) for a comparison covering the US, Japan and Europe. These 
expenditures have not yet been accepted as investment in the SNA but changing the latter is a 
lengthy process and it is quite possible that some or all of them will be in a future revision.  
 
The effect on TFP calculations is quite complicated. The level of GDP rises since there are 
new forms of investment to include. But whether the growth rate of GDP changes depends on 
whether the new forms of investment are growing faster or slower than the old ones. A 
similar point applies to the growth rate of capital on the input side. In fact the analysis is very 
similar to the case just considered of mismeasured quality change, except that in addition the 
various weights involved in the calculation also change. The net effect is that TFP is still an 
important factor in the growth process. Corrado et al. (2013) find that TFP accounted for 26% 
of labour productivity growth in the EU (unweighted average), for 22% in Japan and for 39% 
in the US over 1995-2007 (their Table 2). These figures are not so different from those 
derivable from Table 8 which to repeat include software but not R&D or the other 
intangibles. For example according to EU KLEMS TFP accounted for 35% of labour 
productivity growth in the United States over 1978-2007. While a fuller accounting for the 
inputs behind the growth process is clearly desirable, on the evidence so far it does not seem 
likely to eliminate TFP as a factor or even to change its importance in a growth accounting 
sense.  
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6.3 Increasing variety and the Romer model 
 
In Romer’s (1986) and (1990) model of economic growth there is a goods sector with a 
production function of the following form: 
 
1
0
 
A
Y jY L x djα α−= ∫  
Here a composite good (Y) is produced with the aid of labour ( YL ) and (a continuum of) A 
types of capital good ( 1 2, ,..., Ax x x ). The composite good can be either consumed or invested.. 
Each type of capital can be hired at the real rental price jp . By symmetry, in equilibrium 
each of the A types of capital will be used at the same level of intensity (x) and will bear the 
same real rental price (p):  
 
, all ; , all j jx x j p p j= =  
Hence in equilibrium the production function can be re-written as:  
 
1 1
0
A
Y YY L x dj L Axα α α α− −= =∫  
Since all types of capital have the same rental price, we can “add them up” to get total capital 
services K:  
 
0 0
/
A A
jK x dj x dj Ax x K A= = = ⇒ =∫ ∫  
Substituting this into the equilibrium production function:  
 
1( )YY K ALα α−=  
This is identical to a common or garden Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. 
Clearly capital (K) is subject to diminishing returns so the only long run source of growth is 
the factor A, the number of types of capital good, which acts here like labour-augmenting 
technical progress. If we apply conventional growth accounting to the goods sector under the 
usual assumptions we find that TFP growth is given by  
 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ: (1 ) (1 )YY K L Aµ α α α= − − − = −   
where (1 )α−  can be measured by the labour share (Barro 1999). So TFP growth should now 
be interpreted as the growth in capital variety weighted by the labour share.  
 
In Romer’s model there is also a research sector where new types of capital are created by 
entrepreneurs who expect to profit by patenting their inventions. A full growth accounting 
analysis would have to cover the research sector too, taking into account that the latter is 
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subject to monopolistic competition. But this is not the focus here. Nor do we necessarily 
have to accept the Romer vision that all useful research is carried out by profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs rather than by non-profit organisations such as universities or government-
owned research labs. The point is this: suppose we apply the Romer production function to 
the EU KLEMS sectors studied here. How then should we interpret conventionally-measured 
TFP growth? After all, the latter may reflect conventional notions of TFP such as increasing 
efficiency or manna from heaven technical progress as well as increasing variety. We could 
in fact trivially expand the Romer production function to incorporate “conventional” TFP as 
well as increasing variety:  
 
1( ) , 0YY BK AL Bα α−= >   
where B is conventional TFP, assumed to grow exogenously. Now the ordinary measure of 
TFP becomes  
 
ˆˆ (1 )B Aµ α= + −   
But how then do we decide how much of measured TFP growth should be attributed to 
increasing variety and how much to the other sources?  
 
One response is that we should revise the measure of capital to take explicit account of the 
increasing (or for that matter decreasing) variety of capital types, whether human or physical. 
After all, the proximate source of productivity growth in the Romer model is more capital 
though not more of the same capital. And it is now generally accepted by NSIs that 
investment and capital should allow for increasing quality. So why not also for increasing 
variety? This is the approach suggested by Feenstra and Markusen (1992). Working with a 
discrete CES model they derive a formula for what is in effect a revised index of capital or 
more generally of all inputs. Define a quantity tλ  as the ratio of cost-minimising expenditure 
on the range of inputs available in period t to the cost-minimising expenditure on the range of 
inputs available in period t-1, both evaluated at a common set of prices and a given level of 
output. They then show that the growth of output can be decomposed into two factors: a CES 
quantity index assuming the same range of inputs is available in both periods multiplied by 
/( 1)
t
σ σλ −  where σ  is the (common) elasticity of substitution between inputs ( 1λ ≥ , 1σ > ). 
This latter factor measures the variety effect. Note that the CES index can be calculated from 
prices and quantities alone without any knowledge of the parameters of the production 
function. But it is necessary to know the range of inputs in both periods and the expenditures 
on each. It is also necessary to know (or estimate) the elasticity of substitution σ . At the 
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moment this makes the approach impractical on a large scale.17 But in principle it could be 
used to allocate measured TFP growth between increased variety and other sources.  
 
 
7. Capital externalities and the relationship between TFP and capital 
accumulation 
 
7.1 Externalities, economies of scale, and learning-by-doing: an upper limit 
 
The previous section considered whether capital services are generally mismeasured and if so 
what is the likely size of the resulting error in TFP growth. Another possibility is that even if 
capital is correctly measured its impact may not be. In other words, the elasticity of output 
with respect to capital may exceed capital’s share. This could be because of economies of 
scale. But at the industry level these seem likely to be important in only a few industries 
where a square-cube law prevails, such as pipelines or electricity generation. A more 
plausible reason is network externality effects as a new technology such as the Internet is 
deployed. Another is learning by doing arising from capital investment, either within the firm 
or by follower firms learning from early adopters.  
 
If the elasticity of output with respect to capital (the capital elasticity) has been understated 
by the capital share, then how large would it have to be to eliminate TFP entirely as a source 
of growth? Suppose our model is  
 0
t
ty Ak h e
γ λ
=   (27)  
where y is output per hour, k is capital per hour, h is human capital per hour worked (labour 
quality), λ  is the growth rate of labour quality, and γ  is the capital elasticity which is now 
not necessarily equal to the capital share. Assume that TFP (A) is constant over time (though 
not necessarily across countries). Then the growth of output between time 0 and time t is 
given by 
 0 0ln( / ) ln( / )t ty y k k tγ λ= +   
                                                 
17
  Feenstra and Markusen (1992) state that their approach can be extended to the case where old varieties are 
disappearing as well as new ones appearing. In the Romer model old varieties never do disappear. However, in 
the real world some types of capital, e.g. Jacquard looms, disappear due to obsolescence (they are dominated by 
newer varieties) or because they are specialised on the production of things that nobody now wants to buy 
(newspaper printing presses may be headed this way). It seems necessary to use a quality ladders model to cover 
this aspect of reality (Aghion and Howitt 1992).  
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from which we can solve for γ :  
 
0
0
ln( / )
ln( / )
t
t
y y t
k k
λγ −=
  (28) 
 
The parameter γ  is therefore the hypothetical capital elasticity which would reduce TFP 
growth to zero. Columns (2)-(5) of Table 6 show the data necessary for calculating this 
parameter. Column (10) shows the resulting estimates while Column (9) shows the actual 
capital share for comparison. On average the hypothetical elasticity is more than twice as 
large as the actual share. This seems far too large a difference to attribute to network effects 
or learning-by-doing. An apparent exception is Belgium and Spain where the hypothetical 
elasticity is only about 12% larger than their actual capital shares. But this is because both 
countries had exceptionally low TFP growth (Column (2)).18  
 
We can also test the hypothesis that the capital elasticity exceeds capital’s share 
econometrically. We can regress the growth of output per hour on the growth of capital per 
hour and check whether the coefficient on capital differs significantly from capital’s share. 
This approach runs into well-known econometric difficulties since capital growth is likely 
correlated with the error term which includes TFP. Nevertheless I estimated a model in which 
the current growth of labour productivity in the market sector depends on its own lagged 
growth rate and on the growth rate of capital per hour plus country and year controls. Both 
lagged productivity growth and capital per hour growth were highly significant. When 
estimated by OLS the long run capital elasticity was 0.42 and it was 0.40 when using the 
Arellano-Bond method. This is higher than the actual capital shares shown in Table 8 but 
nothing like high enough to eliminate TFP as a source of growth.  
 
7.2 TFP and the Solow model 
 
In Solow’s model the long run growth rate of both output per hour and capital per hour is the 
TFP growth rate divided by the labour share ( / (1 )µ α− ) plus the growth rate of labour 
                                                 
18
 Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) attribute most of the cross-country variation in levels of GDP per 
capita to TFP differences. Their measures of capital are cruder than the ones in EU KLEMS so the present 
finding can be taken as a useful confirmation of theirs. In fact, if the hypothetical capital elasticity which would 
reduce the cross-country differences in TFP levels to zero is estimated from the data in Hall and Jones (1999, 
Table 1), using the same model as above, its average value over all their 127 countries is 0.793. This compares 
with the value they  assumed for the capital share, 1/3. The mean value of 0.793 is remarkably close to the mean 
value of 0.700 in Table 8.  
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quality.19 In fact the actual labour productivity growth rate exceeds the rate predicted by the 
Solow model in 17 out of the 18 countries here; on average the actual rate is higher by 0.75% 
p.a. The sole exception is Hungary (column 7 of Table 8). Also the growth of capital per hour 
exceeds that of labour productivity by on average 0.96% p.a.; the only exceptions are Austria, 
Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia (column 8). Two explanations come to mind. First, during a 
catch-up phase capital and labour productivity will grow faster in emerging economies than 
their long run rate. Against this we find actual growth exceeding the Solow prediction in 
mature economies as well as emerging ones and even in the United States which is not 
catching up to anyone. Second, the relative price of capital goods, particularly of ICT assets, 
has been falling in recent decades. So a two-sector model where the first sector produces 
consumer goods and some types of investment goods (e.g. buildings) while the second sector 
produces high-tech investment goods may be more appropriate (Whelan 2001). In such a 
model the long run growth rate of capital exceeds that of output even though in value terms 
the capital-output ratio is constant. This is the case even for countries which import all their 
advanced capital equipment. Aggregate growth is still driven by TFP growth at home, but 
also by TFP growth abroad; the latter benefits capital-goods-importing countries via 
favourable changes in the terms of trade (Oulton 2012).  
 
In summary, the two-sector model like the one-sector one still predicts that TFP growth, 
wherever it occurs, drives capital accumulation. The reason is that TFP growth increases the 
marginal product of capital, thus creating an incentive to invest. So we should still expect to 
see a positive association between the growth of TFP and the growth of capital per hour.  
 
7.3 Does TFP induce capital accumulation? 
 
According to the Solow model in the long run output growth is entirely driven by TFP 
growth, the latter taken to be exogenous. And the growth of capital is induced by the growth 
of TFP, i.e. capital growth is endogenous. This suggests testing a model of the following 
type:  
 
, 1 0 1 , 1 , 2 2 3 , 1ln( / ) ln( / )jt j t j t j t jt j t jtK K K K Controlsβ β β µ β µ ε− − − −= + + + + +   
                                                 
19
 This can be seen from equation (27) after setting γ α= , the capital share, and requiring that in the long run 
the growth of capital should equal the growth of output.   
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where j indexes countries and t indexes time; the controls are dummies for country and year, 
and jtε  is a random error. The lagged terms allows for the possibility of a lagged response of 
capital to TFP. The maintained hypothesis that TFP growth is exogenous implies that it is 
uncorrelated with the error term.  
 
Because of the errors we have found in the industry-level TFP growth rates I ran this model 
at the market sector level. The upper panel of Table 9 shows the results of a panel regression 
of the growth of capital services per hour on the growth of TFP; there are 18 countries in the 
panel and a maximum time span covering 1971-2007 (37 years). Since only a few countries 
have TFP data for the full span the number of observation is 445 when the regression is fitted 
with no lags. The results are clear. Current TFP growth is not significant. Lagged TFP growth 
is significant but negative, contrary to expectation. (The year and country dummies are 
always highly significant and in fact provide nearly all the explanatory power). Very similar 
results are found using the Arellano-Bond estimation method (not shown). These results are 
at variance with any theory which sees TFP growth as the exogenous driver of capital growth, 
including both the one-sector Solow model and its extension to two sectors.  
 
However, Basu et al. (2006) have argued that in the short run a negative effect of a 
technology shock (defined as TFP growth purged of utilization effects) on inputs is to be 
expected. In a New Keynesian macro model with sticky prices output doers not initially 
increase following a positive technology shock so inputs fall. In the long run a positive effect 
emerges. They find evidence for this pattern in annual US data over 1949-1996. Also, 
measured TFP is affected by the degree of utilization. This tends to make TFP growth 
procyclical which muddies the waters. To adjust all 18 countries for utilization is beyond the 
scope of this study. But a simpler way to proceed is to reduce the effect of cyclicality by 
estimating Hodrick-Prescott trends of capital per hour and TFP (with the λ parameter set to 
6.25). The same regressions are estimated in the lower panel of Table 9, but with growth rates 
of the trends replacing actual growth rates. Now a different picture emerges. When TFP and 
lagged TFP growth are included on the right hand side current TFP growth is negative and 
significant while lagged TFP growth is positive and significant (columns 2 and 4), the same 
pattern found by Basu et al. (2006). Admittedly, the negative coefficient is numerically larger 
than the positive one, implying that the long run effect is negative. But the reverse is the case 
34 
 
if time and year dummies are omitted (though these are highly significant). All in all, the 
smoothed data are broadly consistent with the findings of Basu et al. (2006).  
 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
Based on an analysis of TFP growth in 10 industries within the market sector for 18 countries 
over 1970-2007, drawn from the EU KLEMS dataset, the main conclusions reached were as 
follows:  
 
1. Any theory which sees progress in science and technology as the cause of TFP growth (at 
least when the latter is correctly measured) would expect TFP growth to be persistent (i.e. 
positively auto-correlated). This is because innovations take time to spread. But at the 
industry level there is no persistence in TFP. However persistence does appear when we 
aggregate industries to the level of the market sector as a whole. I have argued that this is due 
to errors in the measurement of real value added growth at the industry level, leading to 
excessive volatility in year-to-year growth rates. These errors cancel out after aggregation to 
the market sector level.  
 
2. In all the countries considered here resources have been shifting out of agriculture and 
manufacturing, where TFP growth is high, and into finance and particularly business services 
where it is low. In fact, in business services TFP growth is measured to be on average 
negative in 17 out of the 18 countries studied. Despite this I conclude that structural change 
has probably been favourable to growth in most countries. The negative TFP growth in 
business services is very implausible. So I set this rate to the average rate in the market sector 
as a whole, with a corresponding downward adjustment in all other sectors to maintain the 
same aggregate rate. With this adjustment structural change is found to favour growth in 11 
out of the 18 countries, and by an economically significant amount.  
 
3. Underestimation of quality change in capital goods could cause the role of TFP growth to 
be overstated and the role of capital to be correspondingly understated. And such 
underestimation, due to the failure of price indices for capital goods to fully reflect quality 
change, is plausible. But the upper limit for the effects of this mismeasurement seems to be 
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fairly low, of the order of 0.35% p.a. At the aggregate level such an error is partially offset by 
a corresponding error in measuring the growth of output. However at the industry level there 
is usually no such offset so here the effect on TFP is larger. Also the overstatement of TFP 
growth is larger in countries which import most of their high-tech capital goods.  
 
4. Capital’s role could also be understated if expenditure on some inputs is wrongly classified 
as intermediate consumption rather than as investment. The SNA now admits both 
expenditures on software and in R&D as investment where previously they were classified as 
intermediate. The net could be cast wider to include other types of expenditure on intangibles. 
But the evidence to date is that this will not reduce the importance of TFP in the growth 
process. This is because treating more inputs as investment changes the measurement of 
output as well as of capital.  
 
5. Capital’s role in the growth process would be larger if the elasticity of output with respect 
to capital were higher than capital’s share, the latter being the standard growth accounting 
measure. This could be due to economies of scale, network externalities or to learning-by-
doing. But we found that the increase in the elasticity necessary to reduce the role of TFP to 
zero (approximately a doubling) was far too large to be plausible.  
 
6. The pattern of growth in these 18 countries is not consistent with the predictions of the 
standard one-sector (Solow) model. The labour productivity growth rate exceeds the rate 
predicted by the Solow model in 17 out of the 18 countries; on average the actual rate is 
higher by 0.75% p.a. Also the growth of capital per hour exceeds that of labour productivity 
by on average 0.96% p.a. whereas in the Solow model these rates should be the same. These 
facts are more consistent with a two-sector model in which the relative prices of high-tech 
capital goods are continuously falling.  
 
7. Finally, we found that one empirical property of the raw data for TFP is inconsistent with 
standard theory: capital accumulation does not respond positively to a rise in the TFP growth 
rate. This is at first puzzling since TFP growth raises the marginal product of capital, thus 
creating an incentive to invest. However when the data are smoothed to remove cyclical 
effects the expected pattern appears: an increase in the TFP growth rate does increase the 
growth rate of capital per hour in the long run, though reducing it in the short run. This is 
consistent with a new Keynesian model in which prices are sticky in the short run.  
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In summary, we have seen that any attempt to eliminate TFP from the growth story and 
replace it with some wider or better measure of capital seems unlikely to succeed. But we still 
have much to learn about TFP. Given the importance given to TFP by growth theory and 
current fears of a pervasive growth slowdown (e.g. Cowen 2011; Gordon 2016), it is 
depressing that so much of the discussion still needs to be about measurement error. This is 
not the fault of the data compilers who are doing their best with limited resources. But though 
policy-makers everywhere are concerned about these issues they are generally unwilling to 
devote the (quite limited) additional resources needed for improved measurement to advance 
understanding. Until this changes the mystery of TFP is likely to remain unresolved.  
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Domar aggregation 
 
This exposition follows Domar (1961), Hulten (1978), Jorgenson et al. (1987) and Gabaix 
(2011). Start with some basic accounting relationships in an N-industry economy which uses 
C types of capital and D types of labour. For each industry the value of output equals 
payments for inputs (including profit):  
 
1 1 1
:
D C N
i i i lL il kK ik j ijl k jGO PY P L P K P M= = == = + +∑ ∑ ∑   (29) 
Here iGO  is nominal gross output of the i-th industry, iY  is real output, iP  is its price, ikK  is 
the quantity of the k-th type of capital used in industry i, ilL  is the quantity of the l-th type of 
labour, ijM  is the quantity of the j-th type of intermediate input, and , ,kK lL jMP P P  are the 
corresponding prices of capital, labour and intermediate input respectively; the symbol “:=” 
denotes a definition. Note that we are assuming that a given input is sold at a common price 
in all industries; if any intermediate inputs are imported then they are sold at the same price 
as their domestic counterparts. Nominal value added is defined as  
 
1
: :
N
i iV i i i j ijjVA P V PY P M== = −∑   (30) 
where iV  is real value added and iVP  is the price of value added. These last two concepts are 
not directly observable but they become so by totally differentiating both sides of (30) with 
respect to time and collecting terms in prices and quantities:  
 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ:
Ni
iV i ij jj
i
GOP P m P
VA =
 = −
 ∑   (31) 
and  
 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ:
Ni
i i ij ijj
i
GOV Y m M
VA =
 = −
 ∑   (32) 
Here “hats” denote growth rates, e.g. ˆ ln /i iV d V dt= . As defined in the main text, ijm  is the 
share of intermediate input j in the total costs of industry i. Equation (32) defines double 
deflated real value added in continuous time and (31) defines the corresponding price index.  
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At the industry level there are two possible concepts of TFP growth, the value added one and 
the gross output one. The gross output concept is based on the existence of an industry 
production function:  
 1, 1 1( ..., ; , ..., ; , ..., ; )i i i iC i iD i iNY f K K L L M M t=   (33) 
Now define GOiµ  as the gross output concept of TFP growth in the i-th industry  
 
ln
:GO ii
Y
t
µ ∂=
∂
  (34) 
We can readily find that  
 
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
C D NGO
i i ik ik il il ij ijk l jY K L m Mµ α β= = == − − −∑ ∑ ∑   (35) 
 
where , ,ik il ijmα β  are the elasticities of output with respect to the capital, labour and 
intermediate inputs respectively. Assuming competitive conditions these elasticities can be 
equated to the share of each input in the value of gross output (the cost shares) so that:  
 
, 1,...,
, 1,...,
, 1,...,
lL il
il
i i
kK ik
ik
i i
j ij
ij
i i
P L l D
PY
P K k C
PY
P M
m j N
PY
β
α
= =
= =
= =
  (36) 
The cost shares sum to 1.  
 
The value added concept of TFP growth is defined by:  
 
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ:
C DVA VA VA
i i ik ik il ilk l
V K Lµ α β
= =
= − −∑ ∑   (37) 
where ,VA VAik ilα β  are the shares of the capital and labour inputs in value added:  
 
, 1,...,
, 1,...,
VA lL il i
il il
iV i i
VA kK ik i
ik ik
iV i i
P L GO l D
P V VA
P K GO k C
P V VA
β β
α α
 
= = = 
 
 
= = = 
 
  (38) 
making use of (36). Now substitute (32) and (38) into (37) and use (35) to get 
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VA GOi
i i
i
GO
VA
µ µ =  
 
  (39) 
Hence VA GOi iµ µ≥=  with equality iff i iGO VA= .  
 
Note that we have given a theoretical justification for the gross output concept of TFP growth 
by invoking the industry production function. We have given no such justification for the 
value added concept. It is possible to base the value added measure more directly on theory 
by assuming the existence of a value added function:  
 1, 1( ..., ; ,..., ; )i i i iC i iDV g K K L L t=   (40) 
and by assuming that the production function is separable in value added and intermediate 
input:  
 1( , ,..., )i i i i iNY f V M M=   
But this would be a very restrictive assumption since it says that technical progress can never 
reduce the requirement for intermediate inputs per unit of gross output. Note that it is always 
possible to calculate the value added measure by using either the direct formula, equation 
(37), or indirectly from the gross output measure, equation (35), even if this restrictive 
assumption does not hold. But then the interpretation of the measure becomes problematic.  
 
At the aggregate level nominal GDP is the sum of value added in all industries:  
 
1
N
iV ii
GDP P V
=
=∑   (41) 
The growth rate of real GDP (V) is, using the Divisia approach,  
 
1
ˆ
, :
N iV i
i i ii
P VV v V v
GDP=
= =∑   (42) 
where the iv  are the value added shares of each industry in GDP.  
 
Now define the aggregate growth rate of TFP ( µ ) as  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ: (1 )V K Lµ α α= − − −   (43) 
where K is aggregate capital services, L is aggregate labour input, α  is the capital (profit) 
share. Under the competitive assumptions made here μ can be shown to measure the rate at 
which the social production possibility frontier is shifting outwards as a result of 
technological progress (Hulten 1978; Gabaix 2011, Appendix B). In turn aggregate capital 
and aggregate labour of each type can be found from summing over the industries:  
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Divisia indices of aggregate capital and aggregate labour are then 
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  (45) 
These last two equations embody the assumption that a given capital or labour input earns the 
same return in any industry. Finally, the aggregate capital share is  
 
1
C
kK kk
P K
GDP
α ==
∑
  (46) 
and the labour share is 1 α− .  
 
Equation (43) is the top-down approach to measuring aggregate TFP. The latter can also be 
measured by aggregating over industry-level TFP growth rates, the bottom-up approach. 
Straightforward algebra shows that the aggregate TFP growth rate as defined by (43) is 
identically equal to the following aggregation scheme.  
 
1
N GO
i ii
dµ µ
=
=∑   (47) 
Here id  is the Domar (1961) weight for the i-th industry, defined as  
 : ii
GOd
GDP
 
=   
  (48) 
And using (39) we also have an alternative aggregation scheme based on the value added 
measure:  
 
1
N VA
i ii
vµ µ
=
=∑   (49) 
For these equivalences to hold we just need to assume that a given input earns the same 
return wherever it is employed. If this is not the case then the aggregate formulas become 
more complex with additional terms reflecting the shift of resources to or from industries 
where they are more highly valued (see Jorgenson et al. (1987), chapter 2, page 66).  
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A.2  Adjusting sectoral TFP growth rates while maintaining the same aggregate rate 
 
Here I wish to change one or more sectoral TFP growth rates to a predetermined value while 
maintaining the overall rate at its observed value. To see how to do this, start with the value 
added formula for aggregate TFP growth (equation (20)):  
 
1 1
N NVA VA
i i i ii i
v vµ µ µ
= =
= =∑ ∑    
Here the VAiµ  are the adjusted TFP growth rates which we need to find. Suppose that it is 
agreed that the growth rate of the N-th sector should be set equal to the aggregate growth rate 
µ , i.e. VANµ µ= . (Similar formulas can be developed if we wish to set sector N’s growth rate 
to some fraction of the aggregate rate.) Then we have  
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So the adjusted growth rates are  
 ( ), 1,..., 1
1
VA VA VAN
i i N
N
v i N
v
µ µ µ µ = + − = − 
− 

  (50) 
If in addition we set the growth rate in sector N-1 equal to the aggregate rate, i.e. 1
VA
Nµ µ− = , 
then the adjusted growth rates in the other N-2 sectors are  
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1
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  (51) 
(Similar formulas can be developed if we wish to set sector N’s growth rate to some fraction 
of the aggregate rate.)  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
The 18 countries in the EU KLEMS dataset for which TFP data are available 
 
Code Country name First year Last year Number of years 
AUS Australia 1983 2007 25 
AUT Austria 1981 2007 27 
BEL Belgium 1981 2006 26 
CZE Czech Republic 1996 2007 12 
DNK Denmark 1981 2007 27 
ESP Spain 1981 2007 27 
FIN Finland 1971 2007 37 
FRA France 1981 2007 27 
GER Germany 1992 2007 16 
HUN Hungary 1996 2007 12 
IRL Ireland 1989 2007 19 
ITA Italy 1971 2007 37 
JPN Japan 1974 2006 33 
NLD Netherlands 1980 2007 28 
SVN Slovenia 1996 2006 11 
SWE Sweden 1994 2007 14 
UK United Kingdom 1971 2007 37 
USA United States 1978 2007 30 
 
Source: EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release (www.euklems.net).  
Note: The first and last years mark the period for which data on TFP growth are available for 
each country. TFP appears in EU KLEMS in level form so one year is lost in taking growth 
rates.  
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Table 2 
Sectors of NACE, Revision 1 
 
Sector code Sector description Value 
added share 
of GDP, % 
Share of 
total (whole 
economy) 
hours, % 
A & B Agriculture, hunting and forestry. Fishing 4.3 8.3 
C Mining & quarrying 1.4 0.5 
D Manufacturing 22.1 21.1 
E Electricity, gas & water 2.4 0.9 
F Construction 6.6 8.0 
G Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles, and personal and 
household goods 11.9 15.3 
H Hotels & restaurants 2.4 4.1 
I Transport, storage and communications 7.3 6.6 
J Financial intermediation 5.1 2.9 
K (exc. 70) Business services  7.1 7.0 
L Public administration & defence; compulsory 
social security 6.5 6.5 
M Education 5.0 5.3 
N Health & social work 6.1 7.8 
O Other community, social and personal 
services activities 3.3 4.0 
P Activities of private households as 
employers and undifferentiated production 
activities of private households 0.3 1.0 
Q Extraterritorial organisations and bodies 0.0 0.0 
70 Real estate 8.2 0.9 
A-K (exc. 70) Market sector 70.6 74.6 
A-Q Whole economy (GDP) 100.0 100.0 
 
Source   EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release 
(www.euklems.net).   
Note  10 sectors, A-K (exc. industry 70, real estate), make up my definition of the market 
sector. Shares of GDP and total hours worked are means across 18 countries and time 
(maximum span is 1970-2007). Official name of sector K (including real estate) is “Renting 
and business activities”.  
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Table 3 
Persistence of TFP growth (18 countries. 10 sectors within market sector, 1971-2007) 
Dependent variable is growth of TFP (TFPg) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 No lags One lag Two lags Three lags 1971-1990 
One lag 
1991-2007 
One lag 
1971-1990 
Two lags 
1991-2007 
Two lags 
Market 
sector  
Time-
averaged  
Independent variables                     
TFPg(-1) — 0.0180 0.00546 -0.00169 0.0983* -0.0394 0.0651 -0.0365 0.231*** — 
  (0.0280) (0.0275) (0.0280) (0.0572) (0.0307) (0.0612) (0.0308) (0.0549)  
TFPg(-2) — — 0.0259 0.0364 — — 0.0406 0.00612 — — 
   (0.0318) (0.0320)   (0.0635) (0.0356)   
TFPg(-3) — — — 0.0385* — — — — — — 
    (0.0224)       
           
Observations 4,450 4,250 4,070 3,890 1,460 2,790 1,330 2,740 425 180 
R-squared 0.057 0.059 0.062 0.065 0.101 0.055 0.106 0.054 0.325 0.473 
F-test for industry dummies 30.61 23.45 19.16 16.61 8.413 16.63 7.29 14.52 — 23.07 
Probability > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
F-test for country dummies 1.827 1.812 1.43 1.22 1.670 2.37 0.82 2.01 1.83 1.76 
Probability > F 0.0200 0.0215 0.1140 0.2397 0.0676 0.0013 0.6246 0.0084 0.0236 0.0388 
F-test for year dummies 2.166 2.220 2.70 2.57 2.14 1.85 2.86 1.98 3.60 — 
Probability > F 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0037 0.0209 0.0001 0.0113 0.0000  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Source EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release (www.euklems.net).  
Note  OLS estimates. Constant and dummies for country, industry and year included but not reported. Robust standard errors. Column 10, time-averaged: the time mean of 
TFP growth in each of 10 industries within the market sector is regressed on country and industry dummies, i.e. 10 observations for each of 18 countries.  
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Table 4 
Standard deviations of TFP and its components 
 
Variables (growth rates, % p.a.) 
10 industry 
groups 
(N=4,450) 
Market 
sector 
(N=445) 
TFP 6.52 1.91 
Real value added per hour 6.97 2.03 
Capital deepening contribution  2.48 0.99 
Nominal value added 9.01 4.61 
Price of value added 7.85 4.18 
Real value added 6.64 2.61 
Hours worked 4.66 2.24 
 
Source  EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release 
(www.euklems.net).  
Note  Capital deepening contribution is calculated as labour productivity growth less TFP 
growth and includes human as well as physical capital (labour quality).  
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Table 5 
Change in Domar weights between first year and last year 
 
 Sections  
Countries A-F G,H I,J,K Sum 
Australia -0.255 0.151 0.227 0.123 
Austria -0.086 0.035 0.275 0.224 
Belgium -0.104 0.117 0.371 0.384 
Czech Republic 0.179 0.005 0.124 0.308 
Denmark -0.308 -0.024 0.369 0.037 
Spain -0.525 0.050 0.192 -0.283 
Finland -0.022 0.050 0.272 0.300 
France -0.290 0.062 0.297 0.069 
Germany 0.130 -0.008 0.177 0.299 
Hungary 0.152 0.011 0.086 0.249 
Ireland -0.246 -0.027 0.306 0.033 
Italy 0.003 0.182 0.369 0.554 
Japan -0.507 0.042 0.222 -0.243 
Netherlands -0.356 0.065 0.268 -0.023 
Slovenia -0.043 -0.017 0.090 0.030 
Sweden 0.054 0.011 0.079 0.144 
United Kingdom -0.697 0.118 0.452 -0.127 
United States -0.458 0.003 0.300 -0.155 
Mean -0.188 0.046 0.249 0.107 
No. negative 13 4 0 5 
 
Note The first and last years for each country are given in Table 1.  
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Table 6 
Effect of structural change on TFP growth in the market sector, % p.a. 
 
  No TFP adjustments 
Only sector K 
adjusted 
Sectors J and K 
adjusted  
Change in TFP growth due to  
structural change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Country 
Actual 
structure 
Initial 
structure 
Latest 
structure 
Initial 
structure 
Latest 
structure 
Initial 
structure 
Latest 
structure  
No TFP 
adjust-
ments 
Only 
Sector K 
adjusted 
Sectors J 
and K 
adjusted 
Sector K 
adjusted 
to half 
MS rate 
Australia 0.79 0.75 0.60 0.68 0.67 0.71 0.72 -0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 
Austria 1.58 1.80 1.69 1.66 1.79 1.61 1.79 -0.11 0.13 0.18 0.06 
Belgium 0.40 0.55 0.39 0.50 0.45 0.54 0.47 -0.16 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
Czech Republic 1.30 1.06 1.42 1.04 1.44 1.08 1.48 0.36 0.40 0.4 0.39 
Denmark 0.68 0.76 0.95 0.68 0.99 0.73 0.97 0.19 0.31 0.24 0.28 
Spain 0.23 0.33 -0.14 0.28 0.04 0.29 0.03 -0.47 -0.24 -0.26 -0.25 
Finland 1.94 2.02 1.90 1.88 2.06 1.85 2.03 -0.12 0.18 0.18 0.10 
France 1.07 1.17 1.02 1.08 1.16 1.06 1.17 -0.15 0.08 0.11 0.03 
Germany 0.63 0.71 0.69 0.60 0.75 0.57 0.74 -0.02 0.15 0.17 0.14 
Hungary 2.55 2.50 2.58 2.50 2.66 2.52 2.67 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.13 
Ireland 1.96 1.70 1.72 1.79 1.92 2.04 1.95 0.02 0.13 -0.09 0.10 
Italy 0.61 0.76 0.44 0.71 0.54 0.71 0.62 -0.32 -0.17 -0.09 -0.21 
Japan 1.43 1.50 1.36 1.44 1.46 1.47 1.44 -0.14 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
Netherlands 0.81 0.83 0.72 0.75 0.83 0.74 0.86 -0.11 0.08 0.12 0.05 
Slovenia 1.74 1.85 1.65 1.82 1.65 1.83 1.66 -0.20 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 
Sweden 1.50 1.45 1.54 1.38 1.63 1.42 1.59 0.09 0.25 0.17 0.19 
United Kingdom 0.91 1.17 0.66 1.11 0.78 1.1 0.88 -0.51 -0.33 -0.22 -0.42 
United States 0.72 1.07 0.49 0.94 0.57 0.86 0.71 -0.58 -0.37 -0.15 -0.42 
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Table 6, continued 
 
Unweighted 
mean 1.16 1.22 1.09 1.16 1.19 1.17 1.21  -0.13 0.03 0.04 -0.05 
 
Source  EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release (www.euklems.net).  
Note  Column headed “Actual structure”: annual TFP growth calculated using the actual, annually-changing weights. Columns headed “Initial 
structure”: annual TFP growth calculated using the average of the Domar weights of the first two available years. Columns headed “Latest 
structure”: annual TFP growth calculated using the average of the Domar weights of the last two available years. “Only sector K adjusted” 
(columns 4, 5 and 9): for each year and country, TFP growth rate of sector K (Business services) set equal to TFP growth rate in the market 
sector in that year and country; other sector growth rates adjusted to maintain the original market sector growth rate. “Sectors J and K adjusted” 
(columns 6, 7 and 10): for each year and country, TFP growth rate of both sector J (Financial intermediation) and sector K (Business services) 
set equal to TFP growth rate in the market sector in that year and country; other sector growth rates adjusted to maintain the original market 
sector growth rate. Column 11: for each year and country, TFP growth rate of sector K (Business services) set to half TFP growth rate in the 
market sector in that year and country; other sector growth rates adjusted to maintain the original market sector growth rate. “Change in TFP 
growth due to structural change”: TFP growth with latest structure minus growth with initial structure. For each country, TFP growth averaged 
over the period for which TFP growth is available (see Table 1).  
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Table 7 
Contribution of each sector to the effect of structural change on TFP growth, by country 
(TFP growth in business services set equal to market sector rate) 
 
Country Sectors 
A&B C D E F G H I J K Total 
Australia -0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.01 
Austria -0.13 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.13 
Belgium -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.05 
Czech Republic -0.04 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.40 
Denmark -0.15 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.31 
Spain -0.15 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.24 
Finland -0.31 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.18 
France -0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.08 
Germany -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.15 
Hungary -0.21 -0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.16 
Ireland -0.18 0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.08 0.13 
Italy -0.27 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.06 0.06 -0.17 
Japan -0.01 0.00 -0.23 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.02 
Netherlands -0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.08 
Slovenia -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.17 
Sweden -0.04 -0.01 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.25 
United Kingdom -0.06 -0.03 -0.44 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.16 -0.33 
United States -0.06 0.00 -0.26 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.09 -0.37 
            
Mean -0.11 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 
 
Source  EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release (www.euklems.net) and own calculations.  
Note  See text and note to Table 6. The rightmost column here is the same as column (9) of Table 6.  
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Table 8 
Mean growth rates of TFP, labour productivity (LP), labour quality (LQ) and capital per hour (KH) in the market sector, % p.a.  
 
Country Period TFP 
 
LQ LP KH 
LP_ 
Solow 
 (4) minus 
(6) 
(5) minus 
(4)  
 Capital 
share 
 
γ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Australia 1983-2007 0.79 0.25 2.12 2.98 1.43  0.69 0.86  0.354 0.626 
Austria 1981-2007 1.58 0.30 2.70 2.55 2.69  0.01 -0.15  0.332 0.938 
Belgium 1981-2006 0.40 0.43 2.27 4.77 1.03  1.24 2.50  0.328 0.386 
Czech Republic 1996-2007 1.30 0.45 3.92 5.57 2.61  1.31 1.65  0.408 0.623 
Denmark 1981-2007 0.68 0.33 2.30 4.58 1.30  1.00 2.28  0.295 0.432 
Spain 1981-2007 0.23 0.55 1.98 3.39 0.91  1.07 1.41  0.360 0.423 
Finland 1971-2007 1.94 0.63 3.86 4.50 3.49  0.37 0.64  0.289 0.719 
France 1981-2007 1.07 0.57 2.59 3.41 2.01  0.58 0.82  0.264 0.591 
Germany 1992-2007 0.63 0.06 1.89 4.73 0.94  0.95 2.84  0.271 0.386 
Hungary 1996-2007 2.55 0.71 3.93 1.82 4.85  -0.92 -2.11  0.391 1.770 
Ireland 1989-2007 1.96 0.03 3.88 3.61 3.48  0.40 -0.27  0.447 1.066 
Italy 1971-2007 0.61 0.12 2.07 3.98 0.92  1.15 1.91  0.260 0.489 
Japan 1974-2006 1.43 0.56 3.48 4.25 2.70  0.78 0.77  0.343 0.688 
Netherlands 1980-2007 0.81 0.37 1.78 2.24 1.58  0.20 0.46  0.315 0.631 
Slovenia 1996-2006 1.74 0.74 5.24 3.46 2.90  2.34 -1.78  0.204 1.304 
Sweden 1994-2007 1.50 0.40 3.48 4.94 2.62  0.86 1.46  0.323 0.624 
United Kingdom 1971-2007 0.91 0.43 2.47 4.78 1.74  0.73 2.31  0.285 0.427 
United States 1978-2007 0.72 0.33 2.07 3.67 1.40  0.67 1.60  0.315 0.475 
Cross-country mean  
 1.16 0.40 2.89 3.85 2.14  0.75 0.96  0.321 0.700 
 
Source  EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release (www.euklems.net).   
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Table 8, continued 
 
Note  LP: real value added per hour worked. LQ: labour quality (labour services per hour worked, LAB_QPH in EU KLEMS). LP_Solow: 
TFP growth divided by labour share (estimated as LAB/VA in terms of EU KLEMS variables) plus the growth of labour quality. For each 
country, growth rates are Törnqvist indices built up from sectoral growth rates and are averaged over the period for which TFP growth is 
available: see Table 1. Capital share (col. 9): 1 minus labour share. The parameter γ (col. 10) is the hypothetical elasticity of output with respect 
to capital which would reduce TFP growth to zero: see equation (28).  
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Table 9 
Does the growth of capital deepening depend on the growth of TFP (TFPg)? 
Dependent variable is the growth rate of capital services per hour (KHg) 
 
A. Original growth rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent variables 
KHg(-1) 0.390*** 0.337*** 0.481*** 0.478*** 0.623*** 
(0.144) (0.0786) (0.0433) (0.0428) (0.0413) 
TFPg -0.0563 0.0459 0.0767 
(0.0748) (0.0676) (0.0670) 
TFPg(-1) -0.285*** -0.250*** -0.232*** -0.176*** 
(0.0489) (0.0475) (0.0465) (0.0541) 
TFPg(-2) -0.0706 -0.0785 0.0807 
(0.0565) (0.0583) (0.0578) 
Observations 434 425 407 407 407 
R-squared 0.377 0.567 0.604 0.601 0.428 
F-test for country dummies 1.193 2.641 3.385 3.611 − 
Prob > F 0.267 0.000445 0 2.45e-06 
F-test for year dummies 2.612 3.589 4.110 4.361 − 
Prob > F 4.27e-06 4.13e-10 8.51e-06 0   
 
B. Growth rates of HP trends 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent variables 
KHg(-1) 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.960*** 
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0125) 
TFPg -0.0670** -0.206** 0.121 
(0.0263) (0.0834) (0.144) 
TFPg(-1) 0.146* -0.520* -0.317*** -0.481*** 
(0.0800) (0.266) (0.0862) (0.0854) 
TFPg(-2) 0.384*** 0.288*** 0.526*** 
(0.148) (0.0840) (0.0827) 
Observations 412 412 412 412 412 
R-squared 0.965 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.947 
F-test for country dummies 5.496 4.661 4.671 4.498 − 
Prob > F 5.50e-11 6.44e-09 0 1.62e-08  
F-test for year dummies 4.930 3.974 4.069 4.119 − 
Prob > F 0 0 6.11e-09 0   
 
 
Source  EU KLEMS, March 2011 update of the November 2009 release 
(www.euklems.net).   
Note  KHg: Growth rate of capital services per hour; TFPg: growth rate of TFP, both for the 
market sector. Growth rates of HP trends: growth rates of Hodrick-Prescott smoothed levels 
setting λ parameter to 6.25. Panel regression estimated by OLS with 18 countries over a 
maximum time span of 1971-2007. Constant and year and country dummies included but 
coefficients not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
* p<0.10.  
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Chart 2 
Mean TFP growth rates in the market sector , % p.a. 
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Chart 3 
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Chart 3, continued 
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Chart 3, continued 
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Chart 4a 
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Chart 4b 
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Chart 4c 
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Chart 4d 
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Chart 4e 
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Chart 4f 
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Chart 4g 
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Chart 6a 
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Chart 6b 
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